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Abstract
This paper investigates how an organization attempts to repair trust after organizational-level integrity 
violations by examining the influence of organizational rules on trust repair. We reconstruct the prominent 
corruption case of Siemens AG, which has faced the greatest bribery scandal in the history of German 
business. Our findings suggest that tightening organizational rules is an appropriate signal of trustworthiness 
for external stakeholders to demonstrate that the organization seriously intends to prevent integrity 
violations in the future. However, such rule adjustments were the source of dissatisfaction among employees 
since the new rules were difficult to implement in practice. We argue that these different impacts of 
organizational rules result from their inherent paradoxical nature. To address this problem, we suggest 
managing an effective interplay between formal and informal rules.
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Introduction
A central issue in the public discourse around recent organizational scandals has been the lack of 
commitment to moral standards of organizations in general. However, repairing trust in relation to 
an organizational integrity violation has not been studied intensively. Most scholars who address 
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the issue of trust repair focus on people as trustees (e.g. Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007; Kim, 
Dirks, & Cooper, 2009; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004). Only a few studies explicitly deal 
with trust repair on the organizational (e.g. Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; Gillespie, Dietz, & Lockey, 
2014; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010) or inter-organizational level (e.g. Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 
2009), which implies conceptualizing organizations as trustees.
Our study focuses on the specific impact of rule adjustments on organizational trust repair. 
Although the relevance of organizational rules for trust building (e.g. Kramer & Lewicki, 2010) 
and trust repair (e.g. Gillespie & Dietz, 2009) is acknowledged in the literature, the effect of rule 
adjustments in the process of trust repair has not received much attention. This is surprising, since 
most organizations respond to a violation of their integrity by changing their formal organizational 
rules in order to regulate distrust (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). It is assumed that the tightening of 
organizational rules in response to an integrity violation helps to overcome the distrust of stake-
holders, since it provides credible assurance that the causes of previous violations have been elimi-
nated (Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009).
Our study, however, reveals that formal rule adjustments have more complex effects than 
commonly assumed. Building on a case study investigating the Siemens corruption case, we 
demonstrate that rule adjustments implemented by the management had a positive effect on 
regaining the trust of the external stakeholders. Employees, however, were dissatisfied with the 
rule adjustments. As our discussion will show, these differences can be explained by the inher-
ently paradoxical nature of formal organizational rules: they can only be followed by being 
broken.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. First, we review the main bodies of 
literature dealing with integrity violation and trust repair. Second, we present our empirical study, 
which is based on an analysis of newspaper articles of the Siemens corruption case. In the third 
section, we present our findings, which suggest that formal rule adjustments are a double-edged 
sword. While they help in re-establishing external stakeholders’ trust, they have negative effects 
for internal stakeholders. In the fourth section, we discuss our findings by pointing to the paradoxi-
cal nature of organizational rules. As a result, we suggest addressing this paradox by managing the 
interplay between formal rules and informal mechanisms.
Organizational Integrity Violation and Trust Repair
Organizational integrity violations
In their seminal paper, Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) differentiate between three sources of 
trust: ability, integrity and benevolence. These three dimensions of trustworthiness are commonly 
seen as antecedents of trust and can thus be applied to organizations as trustees as well (e.g. 
Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). The relationship between integrity and trust involves ‘the trustor’s per-
ception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable’ (Mayer et al., 
1995, p. 719). Integrity is attributed if a party is consistent with its past actions and if these actions 
comply with preceding promises. However, the congruence between talk and action is not suffi-
cient for gaining a reputation of integrity. As pointed out by Mayer et al. (1995), the principles the 
trustee adheres to must also be perceived as acceptable by the trustor. Only if the principles of an 
organization are morally acceptable in the eyes of the trustor will integrity be attributed. Whether 
or not organizations adhere to their principles and whether or not these principles are acceptable 
depends on the respective stakeholder’s subjective moral judgment (French, 1996). As such, differ-
ent stakeholders can arrive at different and even contradictory attributions in relation to the integ-
rity of an organization.
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In addition, it matters if the observed behaviour is perceived to be intended by the organization 
and cannot be attributed to pure chance or resulting from external circumstances (Aßländer, 2013; 
French, 1996). Only if actions are attributed to the organization and not to the misbehaviour of 
organizational members (for example, ‘rogue employees’; Hurley, Gillespie, Ferrin, & Dietz, 
2013) will integrity be attributed to the organization.
Trust repair after an organizational integrity violation
A severe violation of integrity at the organizational level leads to a substantial crisis of the organi-
zation’s legitimacy (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009, p. 128) and has strong effects on stakeholders’ trust 
in the organization. When it comes to organizational responses to a breach of trust a distinction is 
often made between verbal claims and more substantive actions (e.g. Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; 
Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). Verbal claims such as denials and apologies seem to be the most com-
mon strategy in the face of integrity problems (Kim et al., 2004; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010).
However, in cases of obvious and organization-wide integrity violations, verbal responses may 
not be sufficient, and more substantive actions may be necessary (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). 
According to Tomlinson and Mayer (2009), substantive actions are especially useful if the breach 
of trust can be presented as controllable; that is, if the causes of the violation can be identified and 
remedied. In particular, the implementation of sufficient regulatory controls to prevent and con-
strain organizational members from acting in ways that could lead to future violations is attracting 
increasing interest (Dirks et al., 2009; Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010). 
However, the effectiveness of such controls as a means for repairing trust is somewhat controver-
sial, as we discuss.
According to Gillespie and Dietz (2009), the implementation of measures on a leadership, cul-
tural, strategic or structural level has the potential to regulate distrust after an integrity violation. In 
this vein, rule adjustments are an immediate and highly visible signal that old behavioural norms 
are inappropriate and will be replaced by new ones. Especially when tighter rules are implemented, 
stakeholders may assume that the previous misbehaviour will be avoided in the future. Together 
with a sound monitoring and sanctioning system, tighter rules signal that immoral behaviour is 
unacceptable and that offenders will pay a price (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009, p. 134). Furthermore, 
Gillespie and Dietz (2009) propose that voluntary efforts in particular play a decisive role for the 
repair of organizational trustworthiness. Seen this way, internal rule adjustments have the potential 
to signal a voluntary willingness to change the moral standards of an organization, whereas simple 
compliance with external legal requirements may prove less effective.
In contrast, Sitkin and Roth (1993) question the effectiveness of ‘legalistic remedies’ which, 
among other measures, entail organizational rules. Following their argument, implementing formal 
organizational rules will have a limited effect if rules are inconsistent with individual and cultural 
values. In those cases, trust cannot be re-established by formal, legalistic measures; instead the 
value inconsistencies have to be addressed directly.
This discussion is reflected in the larger debate around the relationship between trust and con-
trol (e.g. Costa & Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007). For some scholars formal control replaces or even 
diminishes trust (e.g. Langfred, 2004). It is argued that extensive monitoring undermines trust 
(Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002). Das and Teng (1998) even show that 
formal control may create stress and therefore negatively affects trust.
Others, who claim that trust and formal control complement each other, at least implicitly, 
emphasize the importance of formal organizational rules in ensuring consistent behaviour. It is 
argued that organizational rules define normative expectations, thereby providing a feeling of cer-
tainty and guidance for interactions between organizational members (Eberl, Clement, & Möller, 
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2012; Möllering, 2005, 2006; Sydow & Windeler, 2003; Vlaar, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2007). 
Following this thought, commonly accepted rules are fundamental for trustworthiness since they 
make behaviour more predictable (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Weibel, 2007).
Despite the differences between the two perspectives, both rely on the effectiveness of 
organizational rules. Formal rules either deliver the standards for sanctioning and monitoring 
(with the latter having the potential to undermine trust) or are seen as a necessary means to avoid 
ambiguity (which might be a precondition for trust building). Studies that address trust repair 
more explicitly rely on the regulatory power of organizational rules. Although broader categories 
such as ‘legal remedies’ (Sitkin & Roth, 1993) or ‘structures, policies and processes’ (Gillespie 
& Dietz, 2009) are used to indicate that an exclusive focus on formal rules will not be sufficient, 
it is still at least implicitly assumed that formal rules are unproblematic in principle. The under-
lying assumption is that rules (i.e. their definition, refinement and observance) only have to be 
implemented and monitored. Problems only result from organizational members’ potential non-
compliance with these rules, but not from the rules themselves. Furthermore, it is implicitly 
assumed that rule compliance has the same meaning for internal and external stakeholders, 
because rule adjustments are expected to repair the trust of employees and shareholders (or other 
external stakeholders) alike.
Against this background, our paper aims to challenge these assumptions (Alvesson & Sandberg, 
2011) by investigating the role of formal organizational rules in the context of organizational trust 
repair following integrity violations. Differentiating between organizational rules, monitoring and 
sanctioning (for a similar argument see Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005; Weibel, 2007) we are 
specifically interested in exploring: (1) how the adjustment of organizational rules helps in repair-
ing trust in an organization after an integrity violation; and (2) the effects of rule adjustments on 
internal versus external stakeholders.
Research Design and Setting
Our case study focuses on the prominent corruption case at Siemens AG. Given our research ques-
tions, a qualitative approach aiming at theory exploration is appropriate (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Graebner, Martin, & Roundy, 2012; Yin, 2009). We theoretically 
sampled the Siemens corruption case for three reasons: (1) corruption is a typical case of a severe 
violation of integrity; (2) corruption at Siemens took place at an organizational level, leading to the 
violation of Siemens’ integrity as an organization; and (3) the management of Siemens was keen to 
restore the organization’s integrity and to rebuild trust in the organization. The Siemens corruption 
case can be seen as an extreme, unique case of bribery worth studying (Siggelkow, 2007) because 
Siemens is nowadays regarded as an exemplary case in the industry for how to deal with bribery 
allegations and enact compliance programmes.
Research setting: corruption at Siemens AG
Historically, Siemens was known not only for innovative products but also for high integrity. The 
company has been mentioned as a ‘best-practice model’ for its ethical standards and its anti-
corruption programmes by the Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS, 2005, p. 9). Concerning 
the anti-corruption policy of his company, Siemens CEO Heinrich von Pierer wrote in 2003:
There is no reason why moral or legal value orientation concerning corruption should be overridden 
outside the company’s home base or home country. … In the recent past, Siemens has had to suffer a lot in 
single cases as well – and has learned. Today corruption amongst employees is prohibited in all forms. 
(Pierer, 2003, p. 28, translated by the authors)
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However, after 2004, Siemens faced a series of bribery and money laundering allegations in 
more than a dozen countries (Wolf, 2009). Ultimately, in November 2006, German public prosecu-
tors and police simultaneously raided Siemens headquarters in Munich and the homes of leading 
managers. Investigations by the German state attorney’s office uncovered more than €2.3 billion 
worth of suspicious payments used to secure foreign contracts, mainly in the telecommunication 
and IT industries (Boehme & Murphy, 2007). The investigations revealed that Siemens had been 
bribing governmental officials to secure contracts and to gain favourable conditions for more than 
three decades (Lichtblau & Dougherty, 2008; Schmidt, 2009). Most of the managers involved were 
clearly aware that they were violating the law, but they acted out of a sense of loyalty to and for the 
benefit of their company (Freiberger, Hagelüken, & Ott, 2008).
Although Heinrich von Pierer, the former Siemens CEO and later Chairman of the Supervisory 
Board, as well as Klaus Kleinfeld, the then acting CEO of Siemens, denied any knowledge of the 
corrupt practices at Siemens, both resigned from their positions in 2007. Peter Löscher, a former 
board member of the US-based pharmaceutical company Merck & Co, then became CEO of 
Siemens and Gerhard Cromme, former head of the governmental commission for the development 
of the German Code of Corporate Governance, was appointed Chairman of the Supervisory Board.
In October 2007, the Munich district court imposed a fine of €201 million on Siemens and, in 
December 2008, Siemens pleaded guilty to violating the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The case 
was mitigated when Siemens reached an agreement with the Federal Court in Washington DC, 
resulting in payment of a fine of US$450 million and sequestration of profits of $350 million (Sidhu, 
2009). In response, Siemens agreed to establish a compliance programme to detect corrupt prac-
tices. Furthermore, Siemens approved to implement effective corporate governance structures and 
accepted monitoring by Theo Waigel, a former German Minister of Finance, during the reorganiza-
tion process (US Department of Justice, 2008). Overall, the scandal cost Siemens approximately 
$2.5 billion, including fines, the payment of tax arrears and legal and professional fees (Sidhu, 2009).
Data collection
Our data collection mainly relied on the analysis of newspaper articles. First, we collected articles 
from the archive of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, which was the leading newspaper in the investigation 
of corruption at Siemens. More than any other newspaper, Süddeutsche Zeitung was able to docu-
ment insider information during the entire corruption proceedings. The Süddeutsche Zeitung is also 
one of the two most prestigious daily national newspapers in Germany.
In addition to the Süddeutsche Zeitung, we included the leading daily German business newspa-
per Handelsblatt and the highly regarded weekly newspaper Die Zeit. We also used supplementary 
newspaper articles from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Welt and the weekly journal Der 
Spiegel, all of which are high-quality national newspapers. Since the Siemens case was subject to 
investigations by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) it was also impor-
tant for us to integrate the perspective of leading US and UK newspapers, The New York Times and 
The Guardian. We accessed the newspaper articles by using their online archives and the newspa-
per database LexisNexis. As a first step, we pre-selected articles published in these newspapers 
between 2004 and 2012 using keywords such as ‘integrity’, ‘corruption’, ‘trust’, ‘rules’, or ‘cul-
ture’, in combination with ‘Siemens’. This led to a total of 6020 articles matching the keywords. 
These articles were then screened to ensure that they actually dealt with the Siemens corruption 
case, since many articles using the keywords were false positives. We were particularly interested 
in articles that included direct quotes from Siemens employees and commentaries from external 
stakeholders and journalists. This screening process narrowed our total to 458 newspaper articles, 
which comprised the data for our closer analysis. Table 1 provides an overview of the number and 
type of newspaper sources used.
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Table 1. Newspaper sources and types of article.
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung (SZ)
Die Zeit 
(Zeit)
Handelsblatt 
(HB)
Die Welt 
(Welt)
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Zeitung (FAZ)
Der Spiegel 
(Spiegel)
New York 
Times 
(NYT)
The 
Guardian 
(Guardian)
Total Percentage
Reports 39 7 4 4 2 9 3 5 73 16%
Reports containing 
direct quotes
65 37 49 13 7 1 25 22 219 48%
Interviews 9 11 5 2 6 7 2 0 42 9%
Commentaries 30 16 23 0 8 1 1 2 81 18%
Commentaries 
containing direct quotes
13 12 12 0 1 3 1 1 43 9%
Total 156 83 93 19 24 21 32 30 458  
Percentage 34% 18% 20% 4% 5% 5% 7% 7% 100%
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Newspaper articles reflect the development and change of public opinion. Moreover, by provid-
ing information and commentaries on organizational actions, newspapers also influence public 
opinion, particularly for external stakeholders, since their direct experience with the organization 
is limited. Analysing newspapers is thus an appropriate research method for understanding the 
reputation of trustworthiness for external stakeholders (e.g. Deephouse, 2000). Moreover, the 
selected newspapers and especially the Süddeutsche Zeitung had access to insider information, and 
particularly the views of Siemens employees.
To ensure the descriptive validity of our interpretation, we compared the external stakeholders’ 
views from the newspaper data with two former published studies of the Siemens corruption case 
(Dietz & Gillespie, 2012; Gebhardt & Müller-Seitz, 2011). To validate the internal stakeholder 
view, we used the internal newsletter Siemens Dialog, conducted four semi-structured interviews 
(formal and informal) with current or former Siemens employees and complemented these with 
two publicly accessible interviews (Claussen, 2011; Rueß, 2011). We also interviewed the leading 
investigative journalist of the Süddeutsche Zeitung. Interviews lasted one hour on average and 
were conducted face-to-face or by telephone/Skype (see appendix A for some exemplary quotes).
Data analysis
We performed a qualitative content analysis of the selected newspaper articles following the cod-
ing procedure of grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The coding of our four main theoreti-
cal categories (‘rule adjustments’, ‘integrity’, ‘stakeholder trust’ and ‘culture’) was discussed and 
triangulated between the authors to arrive at a consistent interpretation. In a further step, we per-
formed a selective (re)coding, thereby differentiating between internal and external stakeholders 
and their respective positive and negative perceptions. An overview of the core categories with 
examples of supportive newspaper statements, together with the total number and distribution of 
our codings for the selected period, is presented in appendix B. In a next step, we adopted the 
methodological approach of Gioia, Corley and Hamilton (2013) and Corley and Gioia (2004) by 
aggregating these theoretical categories into more abstract theoretical dimensions (‘rules as sig-
nals/constraints’, ‘trust repair’ and ‘informal control’). Figure 1 shows how we progressed from 
raw data to aggregate theoretical dimensions.
Findings
Our findings are organized as follows: first, we focus on the connection between integrity and trust. 
Findings reveal that the perceptions of Siemens’ external stakeholders differ significantly from 
those of their internal stakeholders. Second, we identify the adjustment and tightening of organiza-
tional rules as a key mechanism used at Siemens to re-establish trust. Third, we investigate the 
effect of the cultural change efforts undertaken by the Siemens management.
Trust and Integrity
Our analysis of the newspaper articles reveals that trust in Siemens as an organization was an issue 
for two stakeholder groups: (1) external stakeholders (especially shareholders and their representa-
tive institutions) and (2) Siemens’ employees. Internal and external stakeholders’ perspectives dif-
fered significantly in the various time periods analysed. The trust of external stakeholders was 
significantly violated in 2006, and quotations of external stakeholders expressing their lack of trust 
in Siemens as an organization continued to be strongly reflected in our data until the end of 2008. 
For instance, one representative of the most influential shareholder organizations (Deutsche 
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Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz) talked directly about a massive eruption of distrust in 
Siemens:
… a new dimension is reached in the Siemens scandal. ‘Now the worst case has come true: One has lost 
even more trust’. (SZ, 18 January 2008, p. 20)
In addition, a journalist of the Süddeutsche Zeitung commented:
Not only do they cause financial damage, but they also destroy the trust of investors. (SZ, 2 May 2007, 
p. 23)
In particular, the Siemens’ management was held responsible for the loss of trust, as a bank repre-
sentative expressed:
‘The least you can say is that management was not on top of things,’ … ‘A lot of confidence gets destroyed 
when the management acts this way.’ (Jochen Klusmann, Head of Research at BHF Bank in Frankfurt; 
NYT, 18 March 2008, p. 5)
Anti-corruption organizations even talked about a misuse of their trust in Siemens. Peter Eigen, a 
representative of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), was quoted:
‘That was a big disappointment for me. Siemens had cooperated with us well. Many people warned us that 
it was all window dressing. We said one has to have trust. At the end of the day we have to admit that our 
trust was abused.’ (Zeit online, 23 May 2007)
Our data analysis reveals that external stakeholders lost trust in Siemens because of their nega-
tive view of its integrity up until 2008:
Newspaper Statements Theoretical Categories 
(positive/negative perception; 
external/internal) 
Aggregate Theoretical 
 Dimensions 
• On new standards, guidelines, duties,  and 
regulations Rule adjustments 
 Rules as  
signals/constraints 
• On morals and ethics 
• On honesty, hypocrisy, and decency 
• On conistency between action and talk 
Integrity 
Trust 
repair
Stakeholders‘ trust 
Informal control 
• On the perception  of, openness, credibility. 
trustworthiness, and reliability by 
• customers, shareholders, suppliers NGOs, 
accounting and consultancy firms, and the 
public at large 
• On the perception of openness, fairness  
trustworthiness, care support,  and the 
companies future by employees‘ (including 
management) 
• On values and symbols,  
• On informal behavioural norms 
• On solidarity, team spirit, and esprit de corps 
• On lived practice 
• On identity, identification, and loyalty 
• On role models 
Culture  
Figure 1. Overview of data structure.
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‘So far Siemens’ management was thought to be of integrity… nowadays you have to reconsider this.’ 
(Daniela Bergdoldt, German Association for Private Shareholders; Zeit online, 17 November 2006)
It is a big flaw when a corporation like Siemens presents guiding principles, ethic-rules and moral-codices 
and at the same time soils itself. (Journalist commentary; SZ, 2 December 2006, p. 23)
Given these managerial mistakes, it is reasonable to suspect hypocrisy or double standards. (Peter von 
Blomberg, Vice-President of Transparency International Germany, guest commentary; HB 8 January 2007, 
p. 8)
‘Werner von Siemens, who founded a company renowned for its honour and integrity for 160 years, would 
be turning in his grave.’ (Shareholder statement; Guardian, 25 January 2008, p. 34)
However, since the beginning of 2008, external stakeholders seem to have regained their trust 
in Siemens. They believed that the corruption scandal was left behind, as Die Zeit reported:
The reward lies in the public appreciation. Siemens has just reached the highest score in the Dow Jones 
Sustainability World Index … for compliance and risk management. (Zeit online, 28 September 2009)
The Handelsblatt praised Peter Löscher’s achievements in dealing with the bribery allegations:
He [Peter Löscher] was the right man to regain important US investors’ trust. (HB, 26 June 2012, online)
This positive perception of trust was complemented by a disappearance of external stakeholders’ 
negative perception of integrity:
It was the right way to bring to light all of the misconduct and not to conceal them. Only thus is a self-
cleaning possible. (Journalist commentary; SZ, 5 December 2009, p. 25)
Employees, however, perceived things differently. In the early period of the bribery allegation 
(from 2006 until 2008), similar expressions of distrust, particularly towards the management of 
Siemens, prevailed. For instance, employee representatives were quoted as follows:
The disappointment about the bribery scandal and the involvement of top managers go along with mistrust 
in the management, says one [employee representative]. The staff associations agree that the discussion 
about the reasons for the affair exceeds the classical conflict between employees and employers, 
subordinates and management. This is about the entire enterprise. (SZ, 4 December 2006, p. 19)
However, positive perceptions of trust in Siemens among employees, a few of which appeared 
from mid-2010 onwards, remained infrequent compared to the perceptions of external stakehold-
ers. Positive perceptions were mainly expressed by top management. For instance, CEO Peter 
Löscher said in an interview:
‘The acquisition of shares by Siemens employees worldwide is a proof of the trust in a successful and 
sustainable development at Siemens.’ (FAZ, 9 June 2011, p. B1)
However, positive notions of integrity could not be identified among employees. Newspapers only 
reported a few official statements from board members and top managers, but no integrity percep-
tions from normal employees appeared in newspaper reports. Our interview partners confirmed 
1214 Organization Studies 36(9) 
that integrity was not perceived as the dominant internal problem (interviews 1–3). Whereas integ-
rity was the main issue for external stakeholders, it did not play a major role in the trust perception 
of employees.
Our findings reveal a clear difference in the perception of trust for internal and external stake-
holders. When the corruption allegations came up, external stakeholders’ and employees’ trust was 
significantly violated. While Siemens managed to regain the trust of external stakeholders, internal 
stakeholders did not regain trust in the same way. After mid-2008, reports with negative trust per-
ceptions disappeared, but clear indications for a strong positive trust attribution never reappeared. 
Following our analysis, the role of rule adjustments in particular may provide a suitable explana-
tion for the different internal and external perspectives.
Rule adjustments
Repairing trust was one of the top priorities of the new Siemens management and in particular of 
the new CEO Peter Löscher. Right after his appointment, he was quoted as follows:
The Executive Board will sort out things properly and rebuild trust in our company completely – in a fast 
and resolute manner. Top performance and ethics are not a contradiction. Both are necessary. Siemens has 
committed itself to clean up all kinds of misconducts irrespective of the status of affected persons and to 
take all necessary actions. (SZ, 6 July 2007, p. 17)
Siemens implemented a variety of different measures to regain integrity and to rebuild trust in the 
organization. Table 2 gives an overview of the 43 actions undertaken between 2004 and 2012.
We were able to identify seven distinct types of implemented measures (see Table 2): rule 
adjustments, rule clarification, restructuring, monitoring, sanctioning, personnel changes and cul-
tural interventions. As our analysis shows, implementing formal control mechanisms dominated 
Siemens’ response to the corruption allegations, in particular rule adjustments (13 occurrences) 
and monitoring (9 occurrences). Particularly since 2010, rule adjustments were predominantly 
implemented. It appears that Siemens management regards rule adjustments as an important signal 
to stakeholders that substantive action is being taken to ensure morally correct behaviour in the 
future.
However, our data also reveals that rule adjustments (here understood as tightening the existing 
rule system) were implemented not only in order to re-establish trust but also to revise previous 
suboptimal adjustments. Shortly after the first rules had been adjusted to pre-empt corruption, 
concern arose within the organization questioning the appropriateness of the new rules. For exam-
ple, Lothar Adler, the vice-president of the general works council, was quoted in September 2007:
‘Of course nothing speaks against tough standards to prevent corruption … but the corruption fighters should 
not hinder legal business by grotesque requirements. The guideline threatens to undermine conventions of 
politeness by dealing with them like a bureaucratic act of state.’ (SZ, 13 September 2007, p. 1)
Siemens employees, in particular, had the strongest reservations about the new rules (and not 
monitoring or sanctioning).
The new ten-page guideline for presents and invitations brings tremendous trouble to Siemens employees…. 
The general works council is considering legal steps. (Information from top management; SZ, 13 September 
2007, p. 1)
‘Totally impracticable’ (Statement from the general works council; SZ, 20 October 2007, p. 29)
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Table 2. Siemens’ measures against corruption.
Date Type Measures against corruption (Main newspaper sources in brackets)
Nov 2006 Monitoring Installation of an ombudsman (SZ, 18 November 2006, p. 11)
Nov 2006 Rule adjustments Strengthening of internal guidelines in order to close potential gaps 
(SZ, 18 November 2006, p. 11; FAZ, 24 November 2006, p. 13)
Dec 2006 Monitoring Independent investigation of the internal control system (SZ, 12 
December 2006, p. 1; NYT, 28 February 2007, p. 1)
Dec 2006 Personnel changes New Head of Compliance and hiring of an anti-corruption 
consultant (SZ, 12 December 2006, p. 1)
Jan 2007 Rule adjustments Extension and specification of compliance rules for all employees 
and suppliers (SZ, 12 January 2007, p. 19)
Jan 2007 Sanctioning Compliance with rules as component of the performance appraisal 
(SZ, 12 January 2007, p. 19)
Jan 2007 Rule clarification Hotline (“Helpdesk: Ask Us”) for employees in the case of doubt 
concerning rules (SZ, 12 January 2007, p. 19)
Jan 2007 Cultural interventions Comprehensive anti-corruption training (SZ, 12 January 2007, 
p. 19; FAZ, 23 November 2007, p. 17)
Feb 2007 Rule adjustments General interdiction of consultancy contracts in sales and 
distribution (SZ, 7 February 2007, p. 24)
Feb 2007 Restructuring Empowerment of the compliance department and centralization of 
responsibilities (SZ, 15 February 2007, p. 17)
Apr 2007 Personnel changes New Chairman (Gerhard Cromme) of the Supervisory Board (SZ, 
12 April 2007, p. 3)
Apr 2007 Monitoring Forensic accounting check of suspicious payments (Zeit, 7 April 
2004, online)
May 2007 Personnel changes New CEO (Peter Löscher) (SZ, 21 May 2007, p. 17)
May 2007 Cultural interventions Communication of a new compliance vision (SZ, 22 May 2007, 
p. 23; SZ, 16 November 2007, p. 21)
May 2007 Restructuring New structuring of the compliance department with almost 900 
(later reduced to 600) members (SZ, 22 May 2007, p. 23)
May 2007 Monitoring Compliance committee of the Supervisory Board for the 
investigation of criminal action (SZ, 26 May 2007, p. 25)
May 2007 Rule clarification Circular email from the compliance department for clarification of 
rules on invitations and presents (Welt, 31 March 2008, p. 14)
Jun 2007 Personnel changes Change of Head of Compliance (after 6 months, new one in 
September) (SZ, 29 June 2007, p. 4; SZ, 20 September 2007, p. 18)
Jul 2007 Monitoring Hotline (“Tell us”) for ‘whistleblowers’ (SZ, 18 August 2007,  
p. 25)
Sep 2007 Rule adjustments Guidelines (10 pages) on presents and invitations (SZ, 13 
September 2007, p. 1)
Sep 2007 Sanctioning Catalogue of sanctions (SZ, 19 September 2007, p. 1)
Sep 2007 Personnel changes Exclusive Law and Compliance Officer as member of the Executive 
Board (Peter Solmssen) and successive exchange of responsible 
board members and top managers (SZ, 20 September 2007, p. 17; 
HB, 21 September 2007, p. 17)
(Continued)
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Date Type Measures against corruption (Main newspaper sources in brackets)
Sep 2007 Restructuring Reorganization to enhance structural transparency and clarifying 
leadership responsibilities (SZ, 20 September 2007, p. 18)
Oct 2007 Rule adjustments Adjustment of sanctions, new rules and guidelines in order to 
make them more practicable (SZ, 20 October 2007, p. 29)
Nov 2007 Sanctioning Amnesty offer to remorseful and truly informed employees 
(former directors excluded) (SZ, 2 November 2007, p. 21)
Nov 2007 Rule adjustments “Limit of Authority Project”: new rules for decision processes to 
make them more transparent, together with clear responsibilities 
within the Executive Board (FAZ, 23 November 2007, p. 17; SZ, 29 
November 2007, p. 24)
Jan 2008 Sanctioning No tolerance policy and sanctions against approximately 500 
employees due to former corruption (SZ, 16 January 2008, p. 18)
Apr 2008 Rule clarification Circular email from the compliance department to employees for 
clarifying doubtful cases (SZ, 10 April 2008, p. 19)
Apr 2008 Cultural interventions Letter from CEO Peter Löscher to all employees appealing 
urgently to stick to anti-corruption rules (SZ, 15 April 2008, p. 23)
Apr 2008 Sanctioning Claims against former members of the Executive Board (SZ, 29 
April 2008, p. 24)
Jul 2008 Rule adjustments Revision of internal rules to make them simpler (SZ, 26 July 2008, 
online)
Jul 2008 Restructuring Centralization of departments sensitive to corruption (FAZ, 8 July 
2008, p. 15)
Oct 2008 Monitoring Scorecard system for the evaluation of deals with business partners 
(NYT, 7 October 2008, online; HB, 26 October 2010, p. 28)
Dec 2008 Monitoring Installation of an independent external Compliance Monitor (Theo 
Waigel, former German Minister of Finance) mandated by the SEC to 
evaluate internal control mechanisms (SZ, 15 December 2008, p. 2)
Jan 2009 Rule adjustments Simplification of corruption guidelines to make them easier to 
handle (SZ, 24 January 2009, p. 27)
Sep 2009 Monitoring “Collective action projects”: cooperation with competitors against 
corruption (Zeit, 28 September 2009, online)
Sep 2009 Monitoring Report of the Compliance-Monitor’ with recommendations for the 
anti-corruption system (FAZ, 5 September 2009, p. 14)
Jan 2010 Rule adjustments Reduction of rules to make them more efficient. Strengthening of 
individual responsibility (FAZ, 24 January 2010, p. 33)
Jun 2010 Personnel changes Former salesman as new Head of Compliance to make rules more 
practicable (SZ, 23 June 2010, p. 18)
Oct 2010 Rule adjustments Differentiation of rules in relation to countries of high or low 
corruption risk (Spiegel, 18 October 2010, p. 42)
Dec 2010 Rule adjustments Simplification of the business partner tool, no more general 
obligation to use the scorecard system (Welt, 9 December 2010, 
online)
Aug 2011 Rule adjustments Careful relaxation of rules (FAZ, 18 October 2010, p. 11; HB, 25 
August 2011, p. 26)
Jan 2012 Rule adjustments Country-specific scoring system to assess a compliance-relevant 
action (Zeit, 3 January 2012, online)
Table 2. (Continued)
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The Siemens management took the criticism seriously and responded to it by readjusting the 
rules once more.
‘Those rules are a process, which has to develop … Somehow the pendulum has swung too far; we have 
to find the centre again.’ (Peter Löscher, CEO; Welt, 31 March 2008, p. 14)
Many employees have felt threatened by the flood of rules. That’s why Solmssen [Law and Compliance 
Officer] has to backpedal and cut down the extensive set of rules. At the same time he tries to overcome 
the fears of employees… (Journalist report; HB, 13 March 2009, p. 16)
But despite these efforts the rather negative views remained:
To get rid of the stigma of corruption they established a bureaucratic control-organization, which deeply 
upset employees on all hierarchical levels. Is it allowed to drink coffee with business partners without 
being under suspicion of bribery? (Journalist commentary; FAZ, 18 October 2010, p. 11)
Following our analysis, the rule adjustments made in order to prevent corruption practices were 
difficult to implement. Until 2012, employees were quoted as having very negative perceptions of 
the newly introduced rules and their subsequent refinements. The rules were seen as being imprac-
tical due to the high density of regulations, leaving insufficient scope for conducting business. A 
journalist on the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung commented:
The corruption police of Siemens is considering loosening the tight system of rules, which the company 
implemented due to the bribery scandal. Meanwhile the perception is becoming accepted that the quickly 
and with all rigour established standards were too strict and not suitable for practice… The pronounced 
renewal is essentially an act of balancing. (FAZ, 18 October 2010, p. 11)
From the perspective of external stakeholders, however, the introduction of tighter rules and 
their subsequent adjustments were seen as a clear sign that Siemens was taking a proactive stance 
on preventing corruption.
‘I can only recommend to put up with this allegation… One ought to start with too many guidelines. There 
is no safety without bureaucracy.’ (Peter von Blomberg, Vice-President of Transparency International 
Germany; Welt, 31 March 2008, p. 14)
… tough rules, clear competences, and painful consequences. This is the way Peter Löscher tries to drain 
the bribery swamp. Of course this leads to big public applause. (Journalist commentary; HB, 27 May 2008, 
p. 8)
Theo Waigel, the official external Compliance Monitor, was quoted:
…the internal program against corruption and other misbehaviour is the national and international 
benchmark. ‘Definitely Siemens is on the right track.’ (SZ, 8 November 2010, p. 20)
The adjustment of rules and their close monitoring seemed to work for external stakeholders as 
intended. As Figure 2 shows, rule adjustments correlated with a positive perception of trust in 
Siemens by external stakeholders. For external stakeholders, rule adjustments seem to indicate a 
clear intention to increase the reliability of future action. Although the positive perception of integ-
rity was not very strong in our data, the clear negative picture vanished along with the implementa-
tion of rule adjustments.
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However, from an internal stakeholder perspective, the effect of these rule adjustments is more 
difficult to understand. As summarized in Figure 3, the negative perceptions of rule adjustments 
are more prevalent than the positive ones.
To sum up, according to our findings rule adjustments are an effective measure for restoring 
external stakeholders’ trust in the organization in the case of an integrity violation. For internal 
stakeholders, however, the effectiveness of these rule adjustments is not so straightforward, at least 
when they significantly constrain behaviour.
Organizational culture
In conjunction with formal rule adjustments to rebuild trust, the Siemens management claimed to 
initiate a change of Siemens’ culture (see Siemens’ cultural interventions in Table 2). Such efforts 
to change informal practices, values and norms were seen as necessary, since Siemens was accused 
of having developed a culture of bribery.
The corporate culture of Siemens is what made many employees believe that bribes were not only 
acceptable but also implicitly encouraged. (Journalist report; NYT, 7 October 2008, online)
Changing informal norms became a top priority of the new CEO, Peter Löscher. At the annual 
shareholder meeting in January 2008, he was quoted as saying that the leadership culture had 
screwed up (SZ, 25 January 2008, p. 2). Ten months later, in November 2008, he said:
Total
number
of 
codings
Trust (positive) 
Rule adjustments (positive) 
Rule adjustments (negative) 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
Trust (negave)
80 
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Integrity (posive)
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negave percepon
posive percepon
t
Figure 2. External stakeholders’ perception.
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Figure 3. Internal stakeholders’ perception.
‘Today we have open discussions. We compare notes with each other and then we decide. The leadership 
culture has changed dramatically.’ (SZ, 20 November 2008, p. 17)
Siemens’ Law and Compliance Officer Peter Solmssen reiterated in an interview in January 
2009:
‘The cultural change in the Siemens Group towards more openness and transparency is tremendous. If I 
have to reconsider, the effort was worth it.’ (SZ, 24 January 2009, p. 27)
Whereas Siemens’ top management was eager to emphasize the positive aspects of cultural 
changes, these changes resulted in a high level of uncertainty among long-serving employees, as 
the Süddeutsche Zeitung reported:
The problem is that very few employees actually know what’s going on. (SZ, 26 August 2008, p. 3)
Comparing the perceptions of the new culture at Siemens reveals that both internal and external 
stakeholders appraised the new culture as positive. As one journalist stated:
Löscher turned Siemens upside down bringing in new people and establishing a different corporate culture, 
in which clean business is not only talk. (SZ, 11 June 2011, p. 29)
Differences in perceptions, however, occurred in the assessment of the old culture. Whereas exter-
nal stakeholders did not see any positive aspect in the old culture, employees regarded issues such 
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as the high loyalty among Siemens employees as a positive thing, which could erode under the new 
regime. For instance, a works council member was quoted:
For decades the special Siemens culture, hard to understand for outsiders, was in good order. A little bit is 
left, but it becomes less day-by-day. ‘I’m afraid that loyalty is slowly breaking down’, said works council 
member Schuster. (SZ, 26 August 2008, p. 3)
A journalist reports about the Siemens culture:
Feelings got lost. The Siemens family does not exist anymore. At least it is crossed out from the Siemens 
vocabulary. ‘We don’t use this wording anymore,’ confirmed a Siemens manager. ‘It may sound pathetic 
and old-fashioned but the typical Siemens employee did not permanently optimize his CV. Rather he 
worked for the wellbeing of his company,’ said a Siemensian who was afraid this would change. (FAZ, 27 
April 2008, p. 39)
In sum, our analysis supports the statement of Siemens top managers that a cultural change was 
initiated and perceived to be positive. However, Siemens employees felt a certain discomfort in the 
ongoing transition phase. In this respect, the rule adjustments undertaken by the management could 
not be appropriately backed up by new cultural norms.
Discussion
Our findings revealed that organizational rules are a double-edged sword for repairing organiza-
tional trust after an integrity violation. For external stakeholders, the refinement of organizational 
rules signals the willingness of an organization to change its behaviour and prevent integrity viola-
tions in the future (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). However, employees who are directly affected by 
these rules experience such measures as problematic. To explain these findings, we suggest com-
bining insights from the theory of organizational rules with trust research. This has the potential to 
extend our understanding about the relationship between formal and informal rules for restoring 
trust, a topic that has not received much attention in trust research so far (as an exception Gillespie 
et al., 2014; Sitkin & George, 2005).
The paradoxical nature of organizational rules
Our findings show that organizational rules implemented with the intention to pre-empt future cor-
ruption practices were perceived as difficult to implement by Siemens employees. Employees had 
severe problems following the tightened rules in an appropriate way. As our findings show, the 
complaints have triggered new rounds of rule adjustment within Siemens with the intention to 
make them more applicable. In this sense our findings point to a fundamental theoretical problem, 
namely the one between rule-following and rule-breaking (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Geiger 
& Schröder, 2014; Gherardi, 2000).
As noted consistently in the literature on rules and rule-following, ex-ante, generalized behav-
ioural expectations first have to be adjusted to meet specific situational demands and, second, 
require an act of interpretation by the actors in order to make sense out of the principle behind the 
general rule (Ortmann, 2010; Pentland, Haerem, & Hillison, 2011; Pentland & Rueter, 1994). 
Consequently, rule-breaking is an empirically observable phenomenon (Feldman, 2000; Howard-
Grenville, 2005; Turner & Rindova, 2012) which is sometimes necessary for the appropriate appli-
cation of the intention of the rule (i.e. its underlying moral principle) in differing contexts 
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(Luhmann, 1995; Ortmann, 2010). From an organizational point of view, not only the possibility 
but also the necessity of rule-breaking is essential. Or, as Ortmann (2010, p. 206) puts it, ‘it must 
be possible to break rules in order to secure the functioning of organizations’.
Because rules have to be formulated in abstract terms, they cannot precisely prescribe behav-
iour in any situation. To act in novel situations sometimes demands breaking the rule in order to 
fit it to the circumstance at hand (Ortmann, 2010; Turner & Rindova, 2012). According to 
Wittgenstein (1953, p. 39) rules are like signposts: they show the way, but do not determine action; 
as signs they leave space for interpretation. Seen this way, rule-following necessarily involves an 
interpretative act that differs from situation to situation and from actor to actor (Feldman & 
Pentland, 2003). Because of the need to interpret rules to perform them according to their original 
intention, rule-breaking is inevitable and cannot be fully pre-empted by even the most tightly 
defined prescriptions.
The paradoxical nature of organizational rules presents organizations attempting to restore trust 
by establishing general rules that ought to be strictly followed with a fundamental problem: How 
to respond to rule-breaking behaviour? Compliance with organizational rules, as previously noted, 
is seen as a key mechanism to ensure integrity and prevent organizational members from engaging 
in inappropriate behaviour. Consequently, organizations first have to punish rule-breaking, which 
in turn reinforces the rule and signals to external stakeholders that rule violations are not tolerated 
(Ortmann, 2010). This– as far as external stakeholders are concerned – re-establishes trust.
However, rule enforcements had been a very problematic issue for Siemens employees. As our 
findings show, the Siemens management had a clear intention to prevent future failures, and as a 
result, relatively tight rules were established. This attempt to rebuild trust might have two conse-
quences for employees. First, to avoid sanctioning, employees might refrain from breaking rules. 
Statements from the Siemens compliance office supported this view (interview 6). However, such 
strict rule-following behaviour may turn out to be dysfunctional for the organization, because it 
prevents members from adapting to specific situational demands and acting according to the under-
lying moral principle of the rule. As a result, business partners (e.g. customers and suppliers) might 
perceive such behaviour as highly confusing or dysfunctional because a flexible response to their 
demands is no longer possible.
At first Siemens responded to the violation of rules with another round of rule adjustment, lead-
ing to even tighter, more concisely defined rules. It was believed that a more precise ex-ante defini-
tion of potential cases would prepare employees better for the variety of situations they might 
encounter. Because existing rules seemed to leave too much space for interpretation, the Siemens 
management aimed at refining these rules to prevent misunderstanding and misbehaviour. It was 
expected that the need for rule-breaking behaviour would decrease. However, as our findings have 
shown, employees still felt uncomfortable and insecure.
Responding to rule-breaking with more and tighter rules may lead to a form of escalating com-
mitment (Staw, 1976) and a subsequent down-spiralling of organizational trust. Ironically, as 
Shapiro (1987) has noted, such a seemingly inevitable, spiralling evolution of structural constraints 
is intended to ensure and protect trust in an even stronger way. However, the more the development 
of trust is regulated by rules, the more the internal stakeholders will be dissatisfied with the effects, 
seeding the ground for distrust.
The interplay of formal rules and informal control for repairing trust
As the discussion has shown, rule-breaking is necessary to ensure flexibility and meet the intention 
of organizational rules. From an organizational point of view, it is therefore important to under-
stand in which cases the violation of rules is functional (and meets the original intention of the rule 
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in novel contexts) and in which cases it reflects a severe violation of standards, thereby destroying 
trust in the integrity of the firm.
An assessment of when rule-breaking is desirable and when not cannot be regulated by addi-
tional rules. The rule of when to break a rule would be itself a rule that would have to be broken 
from time to time to ensure an effective application of the rule. The idea of a rule determining when 
and how to break rules therefore leads to an irresolvable, infinite regression (Ortmann, 2003). 
Thus, rule-breaking behaviour cannot be regulated by another formal rule but has to be based on 
informal norms. Although rule-breaking is necessary, it remains illegal (Luhmann, 1995, therefore 
speaks of ‘usable illegality’) and cannot be officially requested.
According to the literature on organizational control, informal, normative or social control is 
suggested as an alternative approach to formal control mechanisms (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 
1979). Employees are guided by their shared values and norms, which function as a voluntarily 
accepted constraint on their behaviour (Costa & Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007; Das & Teng, 1998, 
2001; Maguire, Phillips, & Hardy, 2001). In opposition to previous studies we suggest not simply 
looking at these two forms of control as alternatives in the design of organizational controls for 
trust repair but to focus on their interplay. Informal norms have the potential to operate as ‘stop 
rules’ for formal rule-breaking. Against this background, formal rules and informal cultural norms 
are not opposite, separate measures.
Appropriate cultural values and norms provide the necessary freedom for employees to respond 
to situational needs flexibly by breaking certain rules. At the same time, values and norms serve as 
a control mechanism that determines when rules should not and cannot be broken. As informal 
mechanisms, organizational values and norms provide more flexibility and agility than formal 
rules (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002). The design of formal rules may play a decisive role in influenc-
ing how the relationship between formal and informal rules develops. As our analysis has shown, 
Siemens employees complained about the newly implemented rules being too tight. In line with the 
argument of Das and Teng (1998), formal rules that leave enough space for autonomy and do not 
specify every behaviour are much better suited for trust building (in a similar vein, see Luhmann, 
1979; Seligman, 1998). The more behaviour is regulated, the greater the risk that the general inten-
tion of the rules drops out of sight. For example, employees might consider the newly implemented 
rules as mere patronizing. As the study of Walgenbach (2001) suggests, employees respond by 
circumventing rules and developing strategies of ‘creative compliance’. Subsequently, such infor-
mal behavioural strategies could lead to a distortion of the intention of the rule. As a result, tight 
formal rules do not control employees behaviour in a better way (in a similar vein, see Das & Teng, 
1998; Merchant, 1985). Only the appropriate interplay of formal and informal rules can lead to 
organizational trust repair for external and internal stakeholders.
Limitations and Implications
Certainly, such a study is not without its limitations. The first limitation results from the explora-
tory nature of our study and the problem of generalizing from single cases. However, we believe 
that Siemens is an interesting revelatory case, since the firm conducted major efforts to regain the 
company’s integrity and is therefore sometimes even referred to as a leading example in the indus-
try. A second limitation is that newspaper articles comprise our main source of data. This has the 
disadvantage of obtaining preselected data from newspaper journalists. On the other hand, analys-
ing newspaper articles enabled us to study the development of Siemens’ responses and measures 
implemented over a relatively long period of time. As such, we had access to data that would oth-
erwise hardly be available (e.g. insider information). Since a highly sensitive issue like corruption 
is difficult to address in interviews, relying on newspapers seems to be an appropriate 
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methodological strategy in this case. In addition, our results from the newspaper analysis were cor-
roborated by our interview data and the company’s internal newsletters.
Our analysis holds important theoretical and practical implications. From a theoretical perspec-
tive, the interaction between formal rules and informal norms for repairing trust at an organiza-
tional level is important. Our findings support the proposition of Gillespie et al. (2014, p. 399) that 
new rules alone are not sufficient for repairing trust. Formal rule adjustments have to be comple-
mented by cultural reforms (see also Sitkin & George, 2005; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Both are neces-
sary to rebuild stakeholders’ trust after an integrity violation at the organizational level. However, 
our paper extends this perspective by pointing to the specific interplay of both, namely that cultural 
norms regulate rule-breaking. Therefore, our study on the one hand addresses the specific effect 
informal rules exercise on formal ones and, on the other hand, it reveals the dynamics of the for-
mal/informal rule relationship.
From a practical point of view, our analysis questions the value of compliance strategies as the 
most prominent organizational response to an obvious integrity violation. As we have argued 
above, an exclusive focus on rule compliance, partly through establishing a compliance office, is 
not sufficient. From our point of view, a focus on rule compliance is at best a ‘quick-fix’ and short-
term measure for restoring trust on an organizational level after an integrity failure. The basic 
problems go deeper and involve increasing the understanding of potential integrity violations 
beyond mere rule-following. A shared understanding of the specific meaning of integrity in every-
day work practices is a necessary precondition for a substantial change in an organization’s behav-
iour. To avoid misunderstanding, we are not arguing for leaving formal rules untouched in the case 
of an integrity violation. Instead, existing rules should be examined in relation to their intention 
and their informal practice. Appropriate rule adjustments should leave enough space for a flexible 
handling of rules and should be complemented by an informal understanding of the limitations of 
such flexibility.
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Appendix A. Data Sources Used for Validation of the Internal View.
Document Kinds of employees Year Exemplary quotes* Original source
6 interviews with 
Siemens members 
(referred to as 
interviews 1–6)
 
Two Siemens 
veterans from 
corruption-sensitive 
divisions
2014 Integrity was at no time an issue at 
Siemens for ordinary employees. 
Even when I was invited as a 
veteran to Siemens events, nobody 
talked about moral problems. 
Instead, we were concerned about 
the loss of employee solidarity. 
(Interview 1)
At that time a different mentality 
was prevalent. It was like drinking 
beer and driving. Everybody 
knew that it was wrong, but did 
it anyway. For the salespeople 
the change was a real problem. 
They could not just order a taxi. 
(Interview 2)
When Debevoise & Plimpton came 
in, there was an atmosphere of 
fear all over the company. Endless 
interviews, no data protection 
… everybody was afraid to say 
something wrong either because of 
a sense of loyalty or because one 
was somehow involved and had to 
take into account that one’s own 
head would come off. (Interview 3)
… limitations like the kind that 
employees were permitted to 
attend only one of Siemens 
internal Christmas-parties – even 
though they worked for different 
departments – were conceived 
as infringement of long-standing 
traditions and against the old spirit 
of the Siemens-family. (Interview 4)
Own data
One employee 
from the R&D 
Department
 
 One engineer 
working as project 
manager
 
  
 Head of Compliance 
Policies and 
Trainings
2010 We could not avoid this [rigorous 
control mechanisms] since we 
wanted to reach absolute security 
in this matter. During the last year 
the internal control procedures 
have been reworked and the 
numbers of controls have been 
reduced significantly. (Interview 5)
Claussen (PhD 
thesis)
(Continued)
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Document Kinds of employees Year Exemplary quotes* Original source
 Employee from the 
‘Help-Desk’
2011 … the most frequently asked 
questions are concerning restaurant 
invitations from business partners, 
offers for car rides home or gift-
giving. (Interview 6)
Rueß
1 interview 
(referred to as 
interview 7)
Leading investigative 
journalist on 
Süddeutsche Zeitung
2014 Employees at Siemens were deeply 
frustrated with the new compliance 
rules which were introduced 
in 2007 following the SEC 
investigations … the general feeling 
was a fear of rule-breaking.
My impression is that the Siemens 
management learned that the new 
rules introduced were simply not 
practical and tried to regulate 
everything in detail … they learned 
– and I think until the present day – 
they are re-defining the policies and 
have the tight rules only for specific 
countries where they suspect 
bribery on a large scale. But they 
now leave more scope for business 
in Germany for example.
Own data
  
internal 
newspaper articles 
(referred to as 
Siemens Dialog)
 
Statements from 
Siemens’ employee 
representatives
2006–
2011
Concerning the corruption scandal 
at Siemens, … it is now the 
obligation of the Board of Directors 
to regain the lost trust of the 
employees. … It is about credibility. 
(Lothar Adler, Chairman of Works 
Council; Siemens Dialog, 19 January 
2009).
… the Süddeutsche Zeitung was 
ordinarily well informed about what 
happened at Siemens (Statement of 
the labour union IG Metall; Siemens 
Dialog, 15 June 2011)
‘Siemens 
Dialog’ 
(published 
online by 
labour union 
activists)
 
*Translated by the authors
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Appendix B. Selective coding with additional examples from the newspapers articles.
Theoretical 
categories (negative/
positive perception; 
internal/external)
Number of codings/
Distribution 
(newspapers/articles)
Examples of supporting statements* Essential time span
Integrity 41 codings 
distributed over all 
newspapers and 36 
articles
The arrest of Feldmayer [a former 
executive] shakes Siemens to its 
very foundations. He was known 
for his integrity … When such a 
manager ends up in prison, then 
the organization as a whole has 
heavily run out of control. (Journalist 
commentary; HB, 28 March 2007, p. 8)
Where is the hard core of decency 
and moral, which had to be found 
somewhere, on the Executive Board 
at the latest? (Journalist commentary; 
Spiegel, 14 April 2008, p. 76)
‘Bribery was Siemens’s business 
model.’ (Uwe Dolata, spokesman for 
the association of federal criminal 
investigators in Germany; NYT, 12 
December 2008, online)
Nov 2006–Dec 
2008
 
negative
external
  
internal 8 codings distributed 
over 3 newspapers 
and 7 articles
The official company policy was a pure 
façade. (Reference to an employee; 
SZ, 16 January 2008, p. 18)
Many Siemensians feel like him [Josef 
Winter, new Head of Compliance]. 
Ultimately their company, which they 
considered as their family, lost a part 
of its honesty. (Journalist statement; 
HB, 26 October 2010, p. 28)
Dec 2006–Dec 
2008
 
 
positive 
external
 
3 codings distributed 
over 2 newspapers 
and 3 articles
Very few statements from newspaper 
journalists only:
Dec 2009–Nov 
2011
 The new Siemens has nothing to do 
with the old Siemens. Previously, 
the Executive Board under its CEO 
Heinrich von Pierer had collectively 
disregarded evidence of criminal 
actions. (Journalist statement; SZ, 11 
November 2011, p. 29)
internal 6 codings distributed 
over 3 newspapers 
and 6 articles
Very few statements only from top 
managers:
Jun 2008–Mar 
2011
 ‘We are now the most squeaky clean 
company,’ (Senior Siemens executives; 
Guardian, 24 June 2008, online)
 
 ‘After two difficult years, Siemens … 
once again stands on a firm foundation 
of integrity.’ (Gerhard Cromme, 
Chairman of the Supervisory Board; 
SZ, 28 January 2009, p. 21; Guardian 27 
January 2009, online)
 
(Continued)
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Theoretical 
categories (negative/
positive perception; 
internal/external)
Number of codings/
Distribution 
(newspapers/articles)
Examples of supporting statements* Essential time span
 Nowadays Siemens is a prime example 
for integrity. (Peter Solmssen, Law 
and Compliance Officer, guest 
commentary; HB, 25 August 2010, p. 7)
 
Stakeholders’ 
trust
81 codings 
distributed over all 
newspapers and 66 
articles
Siemens’ membership of Transparency 
International had been put on hold 
after suspected corruption cases. 
(Reference to Hansjörg Elshorst, 
President of German Transparency 
International; Guardian 24 November 
2006, p. 31)
The crisis handling of Siemens is as 
little trustworthy as the practices 
of their management … (Journalist 
commentary; SZ, 2 December 2006, 
p. 25)
Mafia-like structures don’t develop 
in companies whose principles are 
openness, fairness and correctness. 
(Journalist commentary; HB, 13 
December 2006, p. 8)
The scale of shareholder distrust in 
the management was laid bare when 
the meeting gave only 72% support to 
executive board members and about 
65% to supervisory board directors – 
including some of Germany’s business 
luminaries – far short of the 90% 
Siemens executives had hoped for. 
(Journalist report; Guardian, 26 January 
2007, p. 27)
Nov 2006–Dec 
2008
 
 
 
negative
external
 
internal
 
36 codings 
distributed over 7 
newspapers and 30 
articles
He [Klaus Kleinfeld, CEO] has not 
succeeded … in gaining the trust of 
his 460 000 employees. (Journalist 
commentary; SZ, 29 September 2006, 
p. 4)
‘Of course, internally there is now 
a certain feeling of fear and siege 
mentality.’ (Gerhard Cromme, 
Chairman of the Supervisory Board; 
Spiegel, 26 May 2007, p. 80)
Sep 2006–Aug 
2008
 
 Formerly, there was trust from top to 
the bottom. (Reference to Christian 
Weller, former ordinary Siemens 
employee; HB, 25 January 2008, p. 12)
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Theoretical 
categories (negative/
positive perception; 
internal/external)
Number of codings/
Distribution 
(newspapers/articles)
Examples of supporting statements* Essential time span
 ‘You have to look at all procedures 
with a maximum of mistrust.’ (Heinz 
Hawreliuk, union representative in the 
Supervisory Board; SZ, 1 August 2008, 
p. 22)
 
positive 17 codings 
distributed over 7 
newspapers and 17 
articles
US authorities positively 
acknowledged that Siemens has 
exchanged the whole executive board 
and installed an exemplary compliance 
system. (Journalist report, HB, 16 
December 2008, p. 14)
‘The acceptance of our proposal 
to install a German [Compliance 
Monitor] for the first time, shows 
the trust of American authorities in 
our cooperation.’ (Gerhard Cromme, 
Chairman of the Supervisory Board; 
Spiegel, 20 December 2008, p. 62)
May 2008–Dec 
2012
 
external
internal
 
3 codings distributed 
over 3 newspapers 
and 3 articles
Only very few indirect statements, mainly 
from the perspective of CEO Peter 
Löscher
Sep 2010–Jun 
2011
‘Therefore, I started to visit our 
company sites in order to meet our 
employees. Thus, I have achieved to 
rebuild trust in a very short time.’ 
(Peter Löscher,; Zeit, 23 September 
2010, online)
 
Rule adjustments 4 codings distributed 
over 3 newspapers 
and 4 articles
Only a few statements mainly from 
newspaper journalists
It is only a matter of time, when 
managers and employees at Siemens 
… will complain about the strict 
rules of conduct … which gave them 
no room to breathe. (Journalist 
commentary; HB, 27 May 2008, p. 8)
‘Siemens has built up an exorbitant 
control-organization, … which cannot 
remain on this level in the future.’ 
(Frank Rothauge, analyst of the Sal. 
Oppenheim Bank; Zeit, 4 December 
2008, p. 23)
May 2008–Oct 
2010
 
 
negative
external
internal 36 codings 
distributed over 6 
newspapers and 25 
articles
Employees are complaining already 
that it is impossible to do business 
in foreign countries with such 
chains. (Journalist statement; Zeit 27 
September 2007, online)
Apr 2007–Jul 2012
(Continued)
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Theoretical 
categories (negative/
positive perception; 
internal/external)
Number of codings/
Distribution 
(newspapers/articles)
Examples of supporting statements* Essential time span
 For such meticulous manuals the 
compliance department internally 
gets nothing but scorn and derision. 
(Journalist statement; Welt, 31 March 
2008, p. 14)
 
 400.000 employees are deeply 
worried. (Journalist statement; HB 10 
April 2008, p. 13)
 
 Due to the corruption scandal there 
are permanent controls, blockades, 
and overcaution. ‘We do not dare to 
do anything spontaneous’, said one. 
(Reference to an ordinary Siemens 
employee; SZ, 26 August 2008, p. 3)
 
positive 24 codings 
distributed over 6 
newspapers and 23 
articles
‘Meanwhile, the program is user 
friendly. I don’t hear any complaints.’ 
(Theo Waigel, external Compliance 
Monitor; Welt, 12 June 2009, online)
Federal authorities said in court 
papers that they were impressed 
by the company’s efforts to identify 
wrongdoing and prevent new 
occurrences through an internal 
monitor and other measures. (Journalist 
report; NYT, 16 December 2008, p. B8)
Aug 2007–Nov 
2011
 
external
 … they have set the clear rule that 
any kind of bribery is forbidden. 
Beyond Siemens this is one of the 
most important lessons learnt. 
(Journalist commentary; SZ, 5 
December 2009, p. 25)
 
internal 10 codings 
distributed over 6 
newspapers and 9 
articles
Only a few indirect statements, mainly 
from the Law and Compliance Officer 
Peter Solmssen:
Nov 2007–Dec 
2012
 ‘Are we confident in stamping out 
corruption? … We’ve made substantial 
progress. It’s never over. … We are 
quite confident we have eliminated 
anything systemic.’ (Peter Solmssen; 
NYT, 7 October 2008, online)
 
 Often our measures might be seen as 
restraining business, but ‘this is not the 
case. Frequently they are even used for 
better cost control.’ (Peter Solmssen; 
Welt, 14 December 2012, online)
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Theoretical 
categories (negative/
positive perception; 
internal/external)
Number of codings/
Distribution 
(newspapers/articles)
Examples of supporting statements* Essential time span
Old culture
negative
external
24 codings 
distributed over 7 
newspapers and 21 
articles
… not transparency but trickery 
dominates Siemens’ corporate culture. 
(Journalist commentary; FAZ, 27 April 
2007, p. 1)
… black money has obviously been 
part of Siemens’ corporate culture. 
(Journalist commentary; SZ, 7 
February 2008, online)
Nov 2006–Oct 
2009
 
 
Above that, Pierer & Co ‘have 
deliberately prevented disciplining 
the workforce’. As a result the 
development of an adequate 
corporate culture was not possible. 
(Reference to the inquiry report by 
Hengeler Müller; SZ, 27 October 
2009, online)
 ‘… a real cultural change is 
necessary.’ (Hansjörg Elshorst, 
President of German Transparency 
International; Zeit, 27 September 
2009, online)
 
internal 14 codings 
distributed over 5 
newspapers and 13 
articles
Mainly indirect statements, primarily from 
Peter Löscher the new CEO
May 2007–Jan 
2009
 ‘… a peculiar culture and an 
independent existence has developed, 
which cannot be controlled by the 
central management board anymore.’ 
(Ralf Heckmann, Chairman of the 
General Works Council; SZ, 19 May 
2007, p. 25)
 
 ‘… a peculiar and misguided behaviour 
has spread.’ (Peter Löscher, CEO; SZ, 
8 January 2008, p. 17)
 
 ‘Leadership culture has failed …’ 
(Peter Löscher, CEO; SZ, 24 January 
2008, p. 3)
 
positive  
external no positive statements  
internal 12 codings 
distributed over 5 
newspapers and 8 
articles
‘Actually, I try to maintain a distance 
to my employer and my job, but at 
Siemens I have lived for the company 
and I was proud of it.’ (Former 
Siemens manager; FAZ, 27 April 2008, 
p. 39)
Jan 2007–Apr 
2008
(Continued)
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Theoretical 
categories (negative/
positive perception; 
internal/external)
Number of codings/
Distribution 
(newspapers/articles)
Examples of supporting statements* Essential time span
 The loyalty towards the firm has 
always been higher than anywhere 
else, the turnover rate lower. This is 
true till this day, despite bribe money 
and various downsizing agendas. 
(Journalist commentary with reference 
to a document on the occasion of 
Heinrich von Pierer’s leaving; FAZ, 27 
April 2008, p. 39)
New culture 2 codings distributed 
over 2 newspapers 
and 2 articles
‘If this is the new Siemens culture 
then enjoy your meal!’ (Werner 
Neugebauer, Bavarian union leader; 
SZ, 10 July 2008, p. 26)
‘Meanwhile, Siemens is overdoing it 
and creates a culture of mistrust (…).’ 
(Elmar Schwager, consultant for anti-
corruption; HB, 9 January 2009, p. 16)
Jul 2008–Jan 2009
Negative  
external  
internal 5 codings distributed 
over 2 newspapers 
and 3 articles
Only a few partly indirect statements, 
mainly from ordinary employees and their 
representatives
Apr 2008–Aug 
2008
 The system of mutual insurance, the 
consensus principle everything has 
broken. ‘… today you only have to 
be quick …’, (Reference to Siemens 
employees at Munich; SZ, 26 August 
2008, p. 3)
 
 ‘This [letting Joe Kaeser announce the 
downsizing plans] signals that ordinary 
employees are not very important 
for him [Peter Löscher, CEO] …’ 
(Representative of the employee’s 
shareholder association; FAZ, 8 July 
2008, p. 15)
 
positive
external
9 codings distributed 
over 4 newspapers 
and 9 articles
In order to avert corruption you have 
to do more than hand out guidelines 
and hope for everything to turn out 
well. The fight against corruption is 
a job for the management and has 
got something to do with leadership 
culture. Every single day. (Journalist 
commentary; SZ, 14 May 2009, p. 17)
‘Siemens has come to terms with the 
past in an exemplary manner. … With 
principles not only written on the 
paper but also truly lived.’ (Berthold 
Huber, German union leader; SZ, 3 
December 2009. p. 24)
May 2009–Dec 
2012
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Theoretical 
categories (negative/
positive perception; 
internal/external)
Number of codings/
Distribution 
(newspapers/articles)
Examples of supporting statements* Essential time span
 ‘Integrity is nowadays an integral 
part of the corporate culture.’ 
(Theo Waigel, external Compliance 
Monitor; Welt, 14 December 2012, 
online)
 
internal 10 codings 
distributed over 10 
newspapers and 7 
articles
Of course he knew the complaints 
about the breakdown of the old 
culture, the Siemens family, but in 
contrast to longtime Siemensians he 
does not share them: ‘Nonsense, 
the junior employees, I deal with, 
appreciate the cultural change.’ 
(Reference to Willi Kallender, 
professor and Siemens veteran; Zeit, 
27 April 2007, online)
Apr 2007–Jun 
2011
 ‘Nowadays, we have a completely new 
leadership culture … No Siemensian 
wants to go through the old times 
again.’ (Peter Solmssen, Law and 
Compliance Officer; HB, 7 June 2010, 
p. 24)
 
*Translated by the authors
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